American University Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 4

Article 5

2018

2017 Government Contract Law Decisions Of The
Federal Circuit
Dennis J. Callahan
Lauren B. Kramer
Lucas T. Hanback
Stephen L. Bacon

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Government Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Callahan, Dennis J.; Kramer, Lauren B.; Hanback, Lucas T.; and Bacon, Stephen L. (2018) "2017 Government Contract Law
Decisions Of The Federal Circuit," American University Law Review: Vol. 67 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss4/5

This Area Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

2017 Government Contract Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit
Keywords

Court of Federal Claims, Contract Disputes Act, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Sovereign Acts Doctrine.

This area summary is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss4/5

2017 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
DENNIS J. CALLAHAN
LAUREN B. KRAMER
LUCAS T. HANBACK
STEPHEN L. BACON*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ..................................................................................... 1274
I. Contractor Claims Cases ....................................................... 1274
A. Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army ...................... 1275
B. Garco Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army ................ 1281
C. Agility Defense & Government Services v. United States....... 1286
D. Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis.................. 1292
E. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States ........................................ 1298
II. Jurisdictional Cases................................................................ 1304
A. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States ..... 1305
B. Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States ............... 1310
C. Starr International Co. v. United States .............................. 1314
III. Bid Protest Cases ................................................................... 1321
A. Diaz v. United States ......................................................... 1321
B. Dellew Corp. v. United States.............................................. 1323
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 1327
* Dennis J. Callahan and Lauren B. Kramer are shareholders, and Lucas T.
Hanback and Stephen L. Bacon are associates in the Government Contracts Practice
Group of Rogers Joseph O’Donnell, P.C. (www.rjo.com).

1273

1274

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1273

INTRODUCTION
Due to structural, procedural, and practical considerations, the
government contracts portion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit’s docket is relatively modest. The Circuit typically issues
fewer than twenty precedential opinions each year in government
contracts cases.1
The court’s 2017 docket was consistent with its previous dockets in
this regard, with only about ten such decisions. Among these, seven
cases can be fairly characterized as being principally about the merits,
while the other three are noteworthy for their jurisdictional rulings.
Because the canon of controlling case law grows slowly, each
individual case holds the potential to exert significant influence on the
decision making of several adjudicative bodies over which the Federal
Circuit effectively has the last word. These lower tribunals include the
Court of Federal Claims (COFC), the Government Accountability
Office Bid Protest Unit, the Boards of Contract Appeals, and several
quasi-judicial forums of administrative agencies. This year the court
added several useful opinions to the canon.
At the beginning of each Part below, we briefly discuss the reasons
why all but a vanishingly few government contracts cases are resolved
before they reach the Federal Circuit.
I.

CONTRACTOR CLAIMS CASES

Contractor claims cases often take several years to reach the Federal
Circuit and typically are resolved long before the court determines the
matter. Instead of being addressed through a judicial proceeding,
most disagreements that arise in the course of contract performance
are addressed on an ongoing basis through administrative procedures,
such as change orders and requests for equitable adjustment. These
contract actions will be reflected in contract modifications, which may
or may not include changes to the price or estimated costs. In many
cases, the required computation of damages—the “sum certain” for
certified claims under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA)—cannot be
made until long after the cause of the damages occurred.

1. Kathleen Hsu, 2015 Survey of Government Contract Cases Before the Federal Circuit,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 933 (2016); Kyle R. Jefcoat, The Federal Circuit’s 2014 Government
Contract Decisions, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 807 (2015).
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The relatively long six-year limitations period under the CDA allows
ample time for the parties to work out their differences. In many cases,
contractors prefer not to submit certified claims early in the
performance period for fear of poisoning the relationship between the
parties. Add in the time needed to conduct discovery and a trial at
either a Board of Contract Appeals or the COFC and it is little wonder
that the five cases discussed below took an average of about ten years
from the events in question to reach a Federal Circuit opinion.
A. Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army
Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army2 concerned the specificity
with which a certified claim to the contracting officer must be stated in
order to appeal an adverse contracting officer’s final decision (“COFD”).3
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit determined that the certified claim must
not only state the government action that caused the damages in a sum
certain,4 but the claimant must also set forth the legal theory that entitles
it to recover on its claim.5 Additionally, in its jurisdictional analysis, the
Federal Circuit stated a rather sweeping condemnation of the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation, which practitioners are
sure to cite often, particularly when they believe a plain reading of the
statutory text favors the result they advocate.6
1. Background
Completed in 1952, Kentucky’s Wolf Creek Dam created Lake
Cumberland, the largest man-made lake east of the Mississippi River.7
For nearly fifty years, Lee’s Ford Dock has operated a marina on Lake
Cumberland under a series of leases with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (“the Corps”).8 The 2001 lease at issue in this case was for
twenty-five years (with a lessee option to extend for another twenty-five-

2. 865 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
3. Id. at 1366.
4. The Federal Acquisition Regulations defines a “claim” to mean “a written
demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of
right, the payment of money in a sum certain.” FAR § 2.101 (2017).
5. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1369–70.
6. Id. at 1367 (“We therefore decline to restrict the scope of the CDA to a
nonlimiting example drawn from the legislative history when the statute uses
unambiguously broader language.”).
7. Ian Urbina & Bob Driehaus, Fears for a Dam’s Safety Put Tourist Area on Edge, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04dam.html.
8. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1363.
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year term) and comprised 130 acres of water and 36 acres of land.9 One
condition of the lease allowed the Corps to “manipulate the level of the
lake . . . in any manner whatsoever” and stated that Lee’s Ford Dock “shall
have no claim for damages on account” of such manipulations.10
Following a series of structural reviews of the Wolf Creek Dam, in
2007, the Corps deemed it to be in such a deteriorated condition that
the water level of Lake Cumberland would have to be lowered to reduce
the stress on the dam.11 It would be seven years before the dam was
repaired and the lake’s water level returned to its previous elevation.12
Although the particulars are not stated in the Federal Circuit’s opinion,
it is fair to surmise that for the better part of a decade, much of the 130
acres of water surrounding Lee’s Ford Dock was actually mud.13
In its certified claim to the Corps, Lee’s Ford Dock alleged that the
unprecedented lowering of Lake Cumberland’s water elevation caused
it to incur at least $4,000,000 in damages.14 In the claim, Lee’s Ford
Dock asserted that at the time the parties entered into the lease they
“could not have envisioned” that the water elevation would drop for
such a long period of time.15 Lee’s Ford Dock argued that the purpose
of the lease—to operate a marina—had been frustrated by the lowering
of the lake level and that the Corps should compensate Lee’s Ford Dock
for its loss.16 The contracting officer denied the claim in its entirety.
As presented to the Corps, Lee’s Ford Dock’s claim for recovery
under a mutual mistake theory had several legal infirmities.17 Among
them, mutual mistakes of fact must rest on present factual errors, not
erroneous predictions of the conditions that may arise in the future.18
Moreover, even if Lee’s Ford Dock had proven that there were mutual
mistakes, the remedy typically would be to set the contract aside, not to

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1363–64.
12. Id. at 1364.
13. See Urbina & Driehaus, supra note 7 (referring to Lake Cumberland’s
residents’ jesting boasts that they “have some of the best ‘mud front’ property in the
country” and noting that forty of the lake’s forty-eight boat ramps were dry).
14. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1364.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(defining mutual mistake of fact as “[w]here there has been a mutual mistake of material
fact, resulting in a contract which does not faithfully embody the parties’ actual intent”).
18. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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award damages.19 This is especially so because the claimant did not
appear to have shown that the government would have accepted the risk
had the parties known of the mutual mistake of fact.20 And even if the
contract were reformed, the reformation would be to the contract terms
themselves, like an adjustment to the lease rate, and would not include a
payment from the government to the contractor for lost revenue.21
2. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals’s decision
Deciding it needed a better theory than mutual mistake on appeal
to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), Lee’s Ford
Dock cast its lot with a superior knowledge claim.22 In its one-count
breach of contract complaint, Lee’s Ford Dock alleged that the Corps’s
inspections of the Wolf Creek Dam conducted in the 1990s—and not
disclosed to Lee’s Ford Dock—revealed the deteriorating condition of
the dam and indicated that Lake Cumberland would have to be drawn
down to repair the dam during the twenty-five-year lease term.23
In July 2014, the ASBCA granted the Corps’s motion to dismiss on
the grounds that Lee’s Ford Dock had not submitted the superior
knowledge claim to the Corps, as required by 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1).24
This decision put the contractor in jeopardy of being time-barred
under the CDA’s six-year statute of limitations.25 That is, following the
ASBCA’s dismissal, Lee’s Ford Dock reasonably was leery of returning
to the Corps in late 2014 for a new COFD that necessarily was premised
on the drawing down of Lake Cumberland seven years prior.
Rather than confront the statute of limitations problem, Lee’s Ford
Dock tried the tack of squeezing a colorable legal theory within the
19. Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (per curiam).
20. Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
21. Id. at 665–66.
22. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
To show a breach under the superior knowledge doctrine, a contractor claiming
a breach by non-disclosure must produce specific evidence that it (1)
undert[ook] to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects
performance costs or direction, (2) the government was aware the contractor
had no knowledge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any
contract specification supplied misled the contractor, or did not put it on notice
to inquire, and (4) the government failed to provide the relevant information.
Id.
23. Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Army, 865 F.3d 1361, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
24. Id. at 1365.
25. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) (2012).
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allegations of its original certified claim. In its amended complaint
before the Board, the claimant’s contract reformation counts alleged
that the Corps had made a misrepresentation by not mentioning the
dam’s condition in the lease and that Lee’s Ford Dock had relied on the
continued functioning of the dam.26 The ASBCA determined Lee’s
Ford Dock had not established these allegations.27 Relying largely on
the lease condition that gave the Corps unfettered right to manipulate
lake levels, the ASBCA also rejected the contract breach count that the
Corps’s prolonged reduction in the lake’s elevation was unreasonable.28
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision
Whereas agency lawyers typically advocate before the Boards,29 upon
appeal to the Federal Circuit, Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers take
over the representation.30 With new lawyers and the broader interest of the
entire government at stake, the DOJ argued that neither the ASBCA nor
the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the claimant’s appeal because the
lease agreement itself was not a type of contract covered by the CDA.31
Under 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a), the CDA only applies to agency contracts
for “(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being;
(2) the procurement of services; (3) the procurement of construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of real property; or (4) the disposal
of personal property.” In this regard, the question before the Federal
Circuit was whether the lease constituted a contract for “the disposal of
personal property” under 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(4).32
The Federal Circuit found it well settled that a lease interest, even of
real property, is a type of personal property that is not itself real

26. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365–66. Curiously, the ASBCA reached the merits
of these claims—even though it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the
factually similar superior knowledge claim—because mutual mistake was the only
premise Lee’s Ford Dock had put to the contracting officer in its certified claim. See
41 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (only claims subject to a COFD may be appealed to the Boards).
27. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365.
28. Id. at 1366.
29. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 6101.5(a)(2) (2017). “The Boards” is a term of art that
practitioners use to refer to various Board of Contract Appeals (BCA), such as the
Armed Services BCA, the Civilian BCA, and the U.S. Postal Service BCA.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012). The BCA hears appeals from a contracting officer’s
decision or the contracting officer’s failure to make a decision. 48 C.F.R.
§ 6101.2(a)(1)(i).
31. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365.
32. Id. at 1367.
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property.33 This left the question of whether the Corps “disposed” of
the personal property through the lease to Lee’s Ford Dock.34 Relying
on the observation that “to dispose of ” something carries a broad
connotation and that Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions of “disposal”
include “to direct or assign for a use” or to “bestow,” the court
determined that with the lease, the Corps had disposed of a personal
property right to the claimant to operate a marina on the premises.35
While the court’s interpretation of § 7102(a)(4) is a fair enough
reading of the provision, it is far from the only reasonable one. Moreover,
the court’s broad reading of “disposal of personal property” appears to be
in direct tension with the notion that jurisdictional statutes that waive the
federal government’s sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.36
It would be just as natural to conclude that the “plain reading” of the
statutory text is that the “disposal of personal property” refers simply
to the sale of a good. Indeed, the first definition of “disposal” in Black’s
is “sale,” and the definition of “dispose of ” states that it is “[o]ften used
in restricted sense of ‘sale’ only, or so restricted by context.”37 In the
context of § 7102(a), it would make sense that “disposal” was intended
to mean “sale,” as the other three provisions refer to situations in which
the government is procuring rather than selling property or services.38
In support of this plain reading the government argued that the
legislative history indicated that § 7102(a)(4) was added to the CDA to
cover surplus sales contracts conducted by the General Services
Administration.39 In enacting the CDA, the Senate report stated that
“[c]ontracts for the disposal of personal property are included within
the coverage of the bill even though they are for the sale rather than
the procurement of property. These contracts are generally referred
to as ‘surplus sales’ contracts. The General Services Administration has
cognizance over all such sales.”40
In rejecting the government’s narrower reading of § 7102(a)(4), the
Federal Circuit noted that the Senate report does not state that the
section “is limited to surplus sales contracts.”41 But, if legislative history
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)).
See e.g., Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Disposal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (4th ed. 1951).
See 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367.
S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 18 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5252.
Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367.
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is to be used at all, it seems to be a tall order to require as a condition
of creditability that congressional pronouncements go beyond an
explanation of what is intended and explicitly exclude what is not
intended. Here, the Senate report explicitly equated the term “disposal”
to its typical meaning of “sales,” specifically referenced Government
Services Administration’s control of all such sales, and noted that the
provision that would be promulgated at § 7102(a)(4) continues a practice
that “ha[d] worked well for many years.”42
To be sure, the court was on solid ground in observing both that
§ 7102(a)(4) is “broad enough to encompass” the lease presented in
the case and that it is inappropriate to use legislative history to inject
ambiguity into a statute where none exists.43 Rather than reinforcing
each other, however, these observations seem to be akin to ships
passing in the night. That a statute is “broad enough to encompass”
one party’s interpretation does not counsel for the adoption of that
interpretation; rather, it suggests that the alternative interpretation,
too, is reasonable and therefore potentially amenable to interpretative
tools such as legislative history.44
4. Importance of the case
Whether the demise of legislative history in statutory interpretation is to
be cheered or lamented is debatable.45 The court’s considered non-use of
legislative history in the seemingly ripe circumstances of Lee’s Ford Dock calls
into question the continued viability of the tool in the Federal Circuit.
Ultimately, though the claimant won the jurisdictional battle over
the breadth of contracts that § 7102(a)(4) covers, it lost the war
concerning whether jurisdiction existed over the appeal of its claim
under § 7103(a)(1), which requires contractor claims to be submitted
to the contracting officer for a decision. Citing Federal Circuit cases
42. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 18.
43. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367–68 (citing Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. United
States, 704 F.3d 949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
44. See Rosete v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 48 F.3d 514, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting
that statutory text is ambiguous where it is “capable of two reasonable
interpretations”).
45. See, for example, the extended exchange between Jonathan R. Siegel and
John F. Manning regarding the constitutionality and wisdom of courts using legislative
history as a tool of statutory interpretation. Compare John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (arguing that a court should not
attribute a committee’s declaration of intent to Congress as a whole), with Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457
(2000) (arguing the judicial use of legislative history is constitutional).

2018]

2017 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS

1281

that had established that a claim denied in a COFD differs from the
one argued on appeal when the appeal “present[s] a materially
different factual or legal theory” of relief, the court had little trouble
finding that Lee’s Ford Dock’s appellate claim injected a governmental
awareness or knowledge component that was absent from the mutual
mistake contention argued in the certified claim.46 For this reason, the
Federal Circuit held that the ASBCA lacked jurisdiction over the
marina’s reformation causes of action.47
B. Garco Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army
With Lee’s Ford Dock and Call Henry, Inc. v. United States,48 Garco
Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army49 forms a cautionary tale for
government contractors in claims cases. The Federal Circuit denied
relief to the contractor, Garco Construction (“Garco”), despite Garco’s
incurring hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional costs due to
what may have been a change in the government’s site access policy
and that at least constituted a stricter application of an existing policy.50
1. Background
For over twenty years, Garco had regularly performed construction
services at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana, with
a labor force that largely consisted of persons living in a nearby prison’s
pre-release facility.51 Even though the base security procedures may
have given the government the right to prohibit access to convicted
felons throughout, no Garco employee had ever been denied access to
a worksite on the base.52
The 2006 contract at issue contained a provision that incorporated the
convict labor clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 52.222-3,
which generally allows contractors to employ convicts in work-release
programs.53 The contract also required contractors to adhere to the base
46. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1368–69 (quoting K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United
States, 778 F.3d 1000, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
47. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1370.
48. 855 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see infra Section I.E (summarizing the Federal
Circuit’s Call Henry decision).
49. 856 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (Mar. 19, 2018).
50. 856 F.3d at 941.
51. Id. at 940. Although the claim concerned the ability to access the worksite of
Garco’s subcontractor, James Talbott Construction, that nuance is not germane to the
decision. For ease of reference, this discussion simply refers to Garco.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 940 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-3 (2016)).
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access policy that stated that contractor employees would be subject to a
“wants and warrants check” in which “[u]nfavorable results will be
scrutinized and eligibility will be determined on a case-by-case basis.”54
Following an altercation at an on-base Garco jobsite involving a prerelease facility worker, the base commander issued a restrictive
interpretation of the base access policy.55
The commander’s
memorandum interpreted the “wants and warrants check” to mean a
general criminal “background check.”56 Thus, whereas the policy as
written could be interpreted as limited only to persons sought by law
enforcement authorities (i.e., those subject to “wants and warrants”), the
memorandum explicitly brought those with criminal backgrounds (even
if not subject to a warrant) within the ambit of the base access policy.
The commander’s memorandum further interpreted the “scrutiny”
of those in a prison pre-release program to require denial of base
access.57 Two days after the commander issued the memorandum,
Garco submitted a request for equitable adjustment, which was later
converted into a certified claim that the Air Force’s contracting officer
denied.58 This claim sought over $450,000 as compensation for the
increased expense of fulfilling the contract under the memorandum.59
In a series of decisions, the ASBCA equated the term “wants and warrants”
with “background check” and found that the base access policy was a
sovereign act.60 The ASBCA denied Garco any recovery.61 Garco’s appeal to
the Federal Circuit principally challenged whether the commander’s
memorandum on base access constituted a change in policy.62
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA in a split decision.63 The

54. 856 F.3d at 940 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 941.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 941–42.
62. Id. at 940. Garco made a claim for damages and an acceleration claim. Id.
This latter claim would have given Garco more time to perform the contract, which
may have mitigated the monetary impact the base access policy had on the contractor.
As the underlying basis for the acceleration claim is the same as the claim for
compensation, however, the acceleration claim, which the Garco Construction majority
rejected in short order, id. at 945, will not be discussed separately here.
63. Id. at 940.
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court was divided on the question of whether the sovereign acts
doctrine is strictly an affirmative defense and thus an argument that
can be waived by the parties or, instead, whether it has a sufficiently
jurisdictional aspect that the adjudicative body must confront the issue
regardless of when it was recognized.64 Additionally, and perhaps
more significant from a practitioner’s viewpoint, the Federal Circuit
accorded deference to the commander’s interpretation of the base
access policy under the Auer v. Robbins 65 standard, which potentially
grants agencies unprecedented discretion in applying their internal
guidance in individual matters.66
a. The sovereign acts split
As a default principle, the United States, as a sovereign, is immune
to lawsuits. It is only in circumstances that Congress has explicitly
waived sovereign immunity that the government may be sued.67 The
CDA waives sovereign immunity for contractors’ lawsuits against their
federal customers.68
But the CDA is not the end of the sovereignty discussion. The fact
that the government acts as a contracting party does not mean that it
has suspended its role as a sovereign. The judicially created sovereign acts
doctrine protects the government from liability for its “genuinely public
and general” acts that render the contractors’ performance
impracticable.69 The sovereign acts doctrine distinguishes the government
from other contracting parties by insulating the government from the
ordinary principle of contract law that states that an owner is liable when
its act prevents the contractor from performing.70
The Federal Circuit panel’s majority viewed the sovereign acts
doctrine as a run-of-the-mill affirmative defense that may be waived,71
and it was enough that the government waived sovereign immunity
64. Id. at 942, n.2.
65. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
66. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 943 (citing id. at 461); see infra Section I.B.2.b.
67. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (stating that a waiver of sovereign
immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”).
68. 41 U.S.C. § 7105 (e)(1)(A) (2012).
69. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
70. See id. As applied here, if the commander’s memorandum is a generally
applicable statement of base access that only incidentally fell on Garco’s contract, the
second prong of the analysis would be reached—whether application of the new
interpretation of the base access procedure rendered performance impractical or
impossible. See id.
71. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 942, n.2.
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through the CDA. Thus, because Garco had not challenged on appeal
the ASBCA’s determination that the base access policy constituted a
sovereign act, the majority deemed the issue waived.72
In the dissent, although agreeing that the sovereign acts doctrine is
an affirmative defense,73 Judge Evan Wallach nonetheless opined that
the doctrine is so “grounded in the [g]overnment’s sovereign
immunity” that “questions regarding the doctrine’s application cannot
be waived.”74 In his view, Garco’s failure to appeal whether the base
access policy was a sovereign act was not the end of the story; the court
should have reached the second question of the sovereign acts
analysis.75 In this context, the second question would have concerned
whether the base could have achieved the aims of its security policy
through less restrictive means, such as requiring Garco to hire a thirdparty law enforcement authority to police the worksite.76
However, because the majority did not reach the application of the full
sovereign acts doctrine, the main sovereign acts takeaway from this case is
that on appeal, a lower tribunal’s conclusion regarding a sovereign acts
doctrine application may be waived and thus must be challenged.
b. Auer deference
Garco’s main contention on appeal was that the commander’s
memorandum constituted a compensable change to the conditions of
the contract.77 This issue required the court to determine whether the
memorandum’s interpretation of the base access policy’s “wants and
warrants” clause to mean “background check” was a change or merely
a clarification of the policy.78
On this question, the court considered the policy to be an agency
regulation to be accorded Auer deference. Under Auer, the court must
defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation unless that
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,”
or there is “reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”79
Contrary to Garco’s argument that the term “wants and warrants” is a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 946 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
Id. at 951, n.5.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 942 (majority opinion).
Id. at 945.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 462 (1997).
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term of art that is much narrower than the commander’s interpretation,
the court found the policy’s phrase to be ambiguous80 and susceptible to
the broader connotation of “background check.”81 As a result, the court
“conclude[d] that the [memorandum’s] interpretation is not plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and [the court] therefore
must give it controlling weight.”82
3.

Importance of the case
The wide berth the Federal Circuit gave the agency to broaden the
number of workers it excluded from the base should be bracing for
contractors and their counsel. The base access policy that was
interpreted by the commander’s memorandum was not a regulation
that emerged from notice and comment rulemaking; it simply was local
guidance that had been unevenly applied for decades. It seems rather
arbitrary for the Air Force to ratchet up base access restrictions without
compensating Garco. Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to
afford Auer deference when doing so “would seriously undermine the
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of
the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.’”83
Often government contract attorneys try to attach controlling
meaning to agency “field memoranda,” “operational handbooks,”
“interpretative letters,” and other guidance that is on par with the base
access procedures here and argue that the agency should have to abide
by them.
According controlling weight to even lower level
“interpretative memorandums” and similar documents adds further
elements of variability and risk to the government contractor’s task.
On March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court denied Garco
Construction’s petition for certiorari.84 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote
a dissent, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.85 Terming Garco
Construction “an ideal case to reconsider [Auer] deference,”86 the dissent
80. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 943.
81. Id. at 942–43.
82. Id. at 945.
83. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012) (quoting
Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
84. Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018) (denying certiorari without
explanation).
85. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1053. Justice Thomas referred to the doctrine as “Seminole Rock deference”
after the case that initially established judicial deference to agency interpretations of
their own regulations, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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viewed the doctrine as a “constitutionally suspect” accumulation of
power in the executive branch because it allows the promulgating
agency the unilateral power to change the regulation’s meaning
without an effective judicial check.87
Quoting his own observation that Auer deference is “on its last gasp,”
Justice Thomas noted several recent instances in which the doctrine
has been criticized by the Supreme Court.88 Whether and when this
prognostication comes to pass, today Auer still commands five votes on
the Supreme Court.89 Thus, “[w]hile the military is far better equipped
than the courts to decide matters of tactics and security, it is no better
equipped to read legal texts,”90 for now on Malmstrom Air Force Base,
“wants and warrants” means much more than it says.
C. Agility Defense & Government Services v. United States
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has observed that “if Iraq
has shown us anything, it [is] the unpredictability of war. Once a
conflict starts, the statesmen lose control.”91 Like policy makers and
military officials, government contracting officers must also deal with
the unpredictable nature of war when they structure contracts and
define requirements necessary to support combat operations and
logistics. A requirements-type contract is one flexible contract vehicle
that can be used to accommodate unpredictable fluctuations in
demand for a particular product or service.
But when the government decides to use a requirements-type
contract, it must provide potential offerors with a realistic estimate of
the anticipated requirements that is based “on the most current
information available.”92 In Agility Defense & Government Services v.
United States,93 the Federal Circuit grappled with the question of how
this obligation applies to requirements that are driven by the timing of
troop movements in a warzone.94 The court held that the government
could not rely on historical data to develop estimated quantities
87. Garco Constr., 138 S. Ct. at 1052.
88. Id. at 1053.
89. See Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 748, 763
(1995) (interpreting Justice William Brennan’s well-known description of the Supreme
Court as subject to the “rule of five” as meaning that “it takes five votes to do anything”).
90. Garco Constr., 138 S. Ct. at 1053.
91. Fred Kaplan, The Professional, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008 (Magazine), at MM40.
92. 48 C.F.R. § 16.503(a)(1) (2017).
93. 847 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
94. Id. at 1352.
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because it possessed information that indicated there was likely to be a
surge in requirements above historical levels.95
1.

Background
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistical support,
supplies, and equipment disposition services to troops deployed all over
the world.96 One component of the DLA, the Defense Reutilization
Marketing Service (DRMS), is responsible for disposing of all excess
personal property generated by the various military services.97 DRMS
has established locations throughout the world where surplus property
is received and processed for disposal or sold on the scrap market.98
DRMS historically processed all surplus property at these locations
for the military services.99 But in late 2006, the director of DRMS
determined that the agency could not handle the expected workload
created by planned troop movements.100 As a result, DRMS issued a
solicitation in early 2007 for a first-of-its-kind contract to dispose of
surplus property received at locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Kuwait.101 The solicitation contemplated the award of a firm-fixed
price requirements contract under which the contractor would be
responsible for disposing of all surplus property received at six
designated locations.102
To offset some of the risk to the contractor, DRMS allowed the
contractor to retain the proceeds of any surplus property that it could
sell for scrap on the open market.103 The solicitation also included a
special clause that the DRMS drafted and intended to address “significant
workload increases or decreases.”104 Clause H.19 allowed the contractor
to recover additional costs (1) if the workload increased at any location by

95. Id. at 1351.
96. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 677, 681 (2015),
rev’d, 847 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1347.
100. Id. Although it is unclear from the court’s opinion, it appears based on the
timing of events that the decision by DRMS was likely influenced by troop movements
planned to execute President George W. Bush’s order to send 20,000 troops to Iraq in
what became known as “the surge.” David E. Sanger, Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at A1.
101. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 680, 682.
102. Id. at 682.
103. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1348.
104. Id.
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more than 150% above the average for the three preceding months, and
(2) if the parties determined that the increase would continue for more
than two months.105 Alternatively, if there were significant workload
decreases at a particular location, DRMS had the right to renegotiate
the price paid to the contractor to operate that location.106
During the solicitation phase, one of the offerors asked DRMS to
provide workload history and projections for each location.107 DRMS
told offerors in an amendment to the solicitation that it did not have
workload projections.108 Although DRMS would not provide workload
estimates, it did inform offerors that it anticipated an increase in
property “turn-ins.”109 In lieu of providing estimates, DRMS provided
a link to a government website that contained historical data that
showed the number of property items, as well as the scrap weight and
scrap sales received for each location.110 The website also showed the
number of personnel DRMS employed at each location.111
A later amendment to the solicitation included a spreadsheet that
showed the amount of scrap weight expected for all six locations
during the base contract year and four one-year option periods.112 The
spreadsheet detailed the expected amount of scrap by weight and
category (e.g., scrap vehicle, fuels/oil, and electronics).113 The
projected scrap quantities reflected a stable workload for the first two
years followed by workload declines in the last three years.114
After Agility won the contract and began performance in early 2008, it
immediately inherited a workload that was substantially higher than the
historical data suggested.115 During the first year of performance, Agility’s
workload was well over double pre-contract levels, and it also inherited
significant backlogs at all locations.116 Agility did not have sufficient staff
to accomplish the work and eventually added over 100 personnel to
perform the contract.117 When Agility attempted to recover funds spent
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 682.
Id.
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1348 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1347.
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1348.
Id.
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 684–85.
Id. at 685.
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on the additional personnel, DRMS took the position that clause H.19 did
not apply because the workload was high from the inception of the
contract.118 Thus, according to DRMS, there was never a time when the
increase was above 150% of the preceding three months.119
After more than two years of performance issues, DRMS terminated
Agility’s contract for convenience.120 Thereafter, Agility submitted two
claims seeking an equitable adjustment of nearly $6 million for costs
incurred to process surplus property in excess of the anticipated
quantities.121 The contracting officer awarded Agility just $236,363.93
and denied the remainder of the claims.122
2.

The Court of Federal Claims’s decision
Agility filed suit in the COFC for the unpaid amounts and increased
its overall claim to nearly $7 million.123 Agility’s complaint asserted three
alternative theories of recovery: (1) DRMS constructively changed the
contract; (2) DRMS provided negligent estimates during the solicitation
phase; and (3) DRMS “breached the warranty of reasonable accuracy
regarding the information provided during the [solicitation] phase.”124
The COFC denied Agility’s claims on all three theories.125
Agility’s constructive change claim was premised on DRMS’s alleged
failure to disclose its superior knowledge about scrap estimates and
troop movements prior to contract award.126 The COFC rejected this
theory because there was no evidence that DRMS had knowledge of
“specific planned troop movements.”127 Further, the COFC found that
troop movements in a warzone were unpredictable and the
government was not required “to be clairvoyant.”128 According to the
COFC, it was reasonable for DRMS to provide historical data instead
of estimates, and the government had no obligation to “search for or
create additional information” to provide to offerors.129
The COFC turned next to Agility’s negligent estimate claim that was
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2015).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. (quoting Serv. Technicians, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 383, 387 (1997)).
Id. at 688 (quoting Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 967 F.2d 579, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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similar to, but not co-extensive with, the constructive change claim. To
prove its negligent estimate claim, Agility had to show that government
estimates were “inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good
faith, or grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate
was made.”130 When awarding a requirements contract, FAR 16.503
provides that agencies “shall state a realistic estimated total quantity in
the solicitation and resulting contract.”131 But the COFC found that
“[w]hen the scope of a contract is extensive or complex, like the
unpredictable demilitarization of vehicles, weapons[,] and other
property in the Middle East, there may be ‘no central point to obtain
accurate predictions of orders.’”132 As a result, the COFC rejected
Agility’s negligent estimate claim and concluded that it was reasonable
for DRMS to “provide[] objective, historical workload data from which
the offerors could extrapolate future needs.”133
Finally, the COFC denied Agility’s claim that DRMS breached “[t]he
warranty of reasonable accuracy[, which] is a corollary to the concept
of negligent estimate.”134 To prevail, Agility had to prove that it
detrimentally relied on a material representation DRMS made as part
of the solicitation.135 Because DRMS expressly declined to provide
estimates in the solicitation, the COFC determined it could not have
made a material representation regarding the expected workload.136
As a result, the COFC found no breach of the warranty of reasonable
accuracy by DRMS.137
Fundamentally, the COFC viewed its task as “determin[ing] which
party, Agility or the [g]overnment, assumed the risk that the costs of
performance would be higher than anticipated.”138 The COFC
observed that this was “an unusually high-risk contract” but concluded
that Agility assumed that risk by agreeing to a fixed price contract while
knowing that the inherent unpredictability of troop movements could
increase requirements.139

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 689 (quoting Medart, 967 F.2d at 581).
48 C.F.R. § 16.503(a)(1) (2017).
Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 690 (quoting Medart, 967 F.2d at 582).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 680, 681.
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3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision.140 The
court only reached Agility’s negligent estimate claim because the other
two theories presented alternative bases for recovery.141 The court found
that the COFC’s decision was erroneous for two primary reasons.142
First, the court found that the COFC erred by ignoring that DRMS’s
projection of scrap quantities was itself an estimate of projected
requirements because the weight of scrap was expected to correlate
with the number of property items turned in by the military services.143
Because DRMS “project[ed] stable and then declining scrap weight,”
the court found that it essentially provided offerors with an estimate
that property turn-ins would “remain constant and then decline.”144
According to the court, it was clear error for the COFC not to treat the
scrap projection as an estimate.145
Second, the court disagreed with the COFC’s conclusion that
DRMS’s provision of historical data satisfied its requirement to provide
a realistic estimate.146 The court held that the government cannot rely
solely on historical data if it has other information that is reasonably
available that can be used to establish a more realistic estimate.147
Here, the court found that DRMS possessed information regarding its
anticipated requirements that went above and beyond the historical
data provided to offerors.148
Specifically, a memorandum dated prior to contract award indicated
that DRMS was aware of planned troop movements and that a surge of
equipment and material was expected to be turned in as units
departed.149 Because DRMS anticipated an increase in workload, the
court found that DRMS’s decision to simply provide offerors with
historical workload data was not “the most current information
available” and did not provide a “realistic estimate” under FAR 16.503.150
The court rejected DRMS’s argument that the parties’ agreement to

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs. v. United States, 847 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1349 n.1.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1351–52.
Id. at 1352.
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clause H.19 foreclosed Agility’s negligent estimate claim.151 In the
court’s view, Agility’s claim did not involve the limited subject of clause
H.19 but was instead “rooted in DRMS’s violation of FAR 16.503,
leading to a large disparity between pre-contract estimates and actual
workloads during the performance period.”152 The court also denied
the government’s argument that Agility’s receipt of scrap sale proceeds
should preclude its recovery.153 The court held that Agility was entitled
to recover on its negligent estimate claim regardless of how much it
was able to recover from scrap proceeds.154 The court reversed the
COFC’s denial of Agility’s negligent estimate claim and remanded for
calculation of Agility’s equitable adjustment.155
4.

Importance of the case
The government often relies on historical data to predict future
needs. In Agility Defense, the Federal Circuit clarified that use of
historical data does not satisfy the obligation to provide a “realistic
estimate” under FAR 16.503 when better and more current information
is available to forecast the agency’s anticipated requirements.156 This
obligation applies even where, as in Agility Defense, the requirements at
issue are driven by inherently unpredictable events such as troop
movements.157 In the aftermath of the Federal Circuit’s decision, the
government will be more vulnerable to potential negligent estimate
claims when it chooses to rely on historical data to project future needs
under a requirements-type contract.
D. Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis
In Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis158 (“Agility PWC ”), the
Federal Circuit was again confronted with a contract plagued by the
151. Id. at 1353.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1354.
154. Id.
155. Id. On remand, the COFC awarded Agility its entire claimed amount of nearly
$7 million. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 723, 725 (2017).
156. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1352 (holding that “it was clearly
erroneous for the Claims Court to find that DRMS complied with the requirements of
FAR 16.503 by providing historical data” instead of its anticipated increase in
workload).
157. Id. (noting that DRMS was not compelled to “guarantee the accuracy of its
estimates or perfectly forecast its requirements” to satisfy its obligation under FAR
16.503).
158. 852 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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unpredictability of war. In Agility PWC, however, the government’s
unanticipated actions during contract administration, rather than
unreliable pre-award estimates, hampered the contractor’s performance.
The Federal Circuit held that, although those unanticipated actions did
not breach the express terms of the contract, they could still form the
basis for a constructive change claim or a claim for breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.159
1.

Background
In May 2003, the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, a sub-agency
of the DLA, awarded a contract to Agility to provide food and non-food
products to military customers in Kuwait and Qatar.160 The original
contract pricing structure called for a “unit price” that would include
a “delivered price” and a “distribution price.”161 The distribution price
consisted of various administrative expenses as well as transportation
costs from the vendor’s distribution facility to the final delivery
point.162 This case involved a dispute concerning the transportation
costs included in the distribution price component of the contract’s
pricing structure.
Shortly after award, the parties modified the contract to expand the
service area to include the Iraq deployment zone.163 Modification 1
(“Mod. 1”) stated that the supply trucks going to Iraq were to be
escorted by the military and would not be used for storage purposes at
the delivery sites.164 Modification 2 (“Mod. 2”) provided that Agility
was entitled to charge the government additional fixed amounts per
day for trips lasting longer than three days.165 The duration of each
trip was to be calculated from the time the trucks were loaded until the
trucks returned to Agility’s distribution facility in Kuwait.166 There was
initially no limit on the maximum fees payable to Agility if trucks
remained in Iraq for long periods.167
159. Id. at 1384 (finding that a party might breach its implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing by “interfering with another party’s performance or acting in such a
way as to destroy” the other party’s reasonable expectations surrounding the
contractual benefits).
160. Id. at 1373.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1374.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.

1294

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1273

Once Agility began performance, its supply trucks experienced
myriad delays on trips from Kuwait to forward operating bases in
Iraq.168 Although the parties expected trips to last seven days at the
time of contract award, the average turnaround time was fifteen days.169
Because some bases lacked cold-storage equipment, soldiers often kept
Agility’s refrigerated trucks onsite to store food.170 This resulted in
numerous trips that greatly exceeded the fifteen-day average,
including one trip that lasted 154 days at a cost of nearly $100,000.171
The parties eventually engaged in a series of discussions about how
to improve the turnaround time.172 Agility wanted its trucks back more
quickly and the government was concerned about the amount of fees
paid for lengthy trips under Mod. 2’s uncapped fee structure.173 Agility
proposed to provide more support personnel throughout its
distribution network in Iraq in exchange for higher fees.174 In return,
the government proposed to place a twenty-nine-day cap on the
transportation fees payable to Agility.175
Agility expressed concern that the proposed cap was “unqualified”
and could result in large losses if trucks were delayed by the
government.176 Agility’s representative “stated that Agility would
prefer to have the ability to submit exceptions to the [twenty-nine] day
rule if the situation is unavoidable despite our best efforts to prevent
it.”177 The contracting officer responded by email that “exceptions to
the [twenty-nine-]day rule will only be considered in the form of a
claim.”178
Despite Agility’s reservations, the parties executed Modification 27
(“Mod. 27”), which included the twenty-nine-day cap on fees.179
Mod. 27 restructured the transportation fees owed to Agility. The new
fee structure included a minimum number of days and a minimum
cost for trips based on the delivery location in Iraq.180 Agility was
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1374–75.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
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entitled to daily fees for additional days beyond the minimum trip
length, except the government would not pay any fees beyond the
maximum twenty-nine-day cap.181 Mod. 27 further stated that
“additional days beyond the established minimum fees are only
applicable if the delay is customer caused.”182 A customer-caused delay was
defined under Mod. 27 as a situation in which the military did not have
“the capability to off load and return the truck” to Agility.183
After the execution of Mod. 27, Agility began submitting claims for
payment to cover trucks that were in Iraq longer than twenty-nine
days.184 Agility claimed that the additional costs were recoverable
because the military was holding trucks for storage in violation of the
provision in Mod. 1, which stated that “trucks will not be used at the sites
for storage purposes.”185 Agility eventually submitted a certified claim
seeking approximately $12.5 million.186 The contracting officer denied
the claim on the basis that Mod. 27 imposed a twenty-nine-day cap.187
2.

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals’s decision
Agility appealed the contracting officer’s decision to the ASBCA.
Agility argued that the government “(1) breached the express terms of
the contract, (2) breached its promise to consider exceptions to Mod. 27’s
[twenty-nine]-day cap on fees, (3) breached the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing, and (4) constructively changed the contract.”188 After a
ten-day hearing, the ASBCA denied Agility’s appeal.189
The ASBCA held that the new provisions included in Mod. 27
modified the storage prohibition in Mod. 1. Specifically, the ASBCA
found that Mod. 27 would have been “useless and inexplicable” if the
government could not use the trucks as storage.190 Moreover, based on
the exchanges between Agility and the contracting officer prior to
Mod. 27, the ASBCA determined that Agility understood that the
twenty-nine-day cap was “unqualified” such that it was accepting all
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1383 (quoting Pub. Warehousing Co., ASBCA No. 56022, 15-1 BCA ¶
36,062, 176,100).
183. Id. at 1376.
184. Id. at 1377.
185. Id. at 1378.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1380.
189. Id. at 1378.
190. Id. at 1379 (quoting Pub. Warehousing Co., ASBCA No. 56022, 15-1 BCA
¶ 36,062, 176,110).
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risks associated with delays beyond twenty-nine days.191 Having
concluded that the government did not breach the express terms of
the contract, the Board stated that there was no need to determine
whether the government breached the implied duty of cooperation or
constructively altered contract performance.192
3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA’s interpretation of Mod. 27
and its decision that the government did not breach the express terms
of the contract.193 Like the ASBCA, the court found that the twenty-nineday cap was “unqualified” and therefore applied to all governmentcaused delays, including storage delays.194
According to the court,
“the language of Mod. 27 abrogated any remaining significance of Mod.
1, Paragraph 4,” which prohibited the use of trucks for storage
purposes.195 Based on the plain language of Mod. 27 and the supporting
extrinsic evidence considered by the ASBCA, the court concluded that
the parties intended to share “the risk of travel times rather than
hav[e] the government shoulder the burden alone.”196 As a result, the
court affirmed the ASBCA’s decision to deny Agility’s express breach
of contract claim.197
The court also affirmed the ASBCA’s denial of Agility’s claim that
the government breached its promise to consider exceptions to the
twenty-nine-day cap imposed under Mod. 27.198 The court recognized
that “neither Agility nor the government ever added or insisted on
language in Mod. 27 regarding exceptions to the [twenty-nine]-day
cap.”199 Rather, Agility agreed to the unqualified twenty-nine-day cap
included in Mod. 27, so its argument was based “entirely on a few lines in
an email exchange” between Agility’s representative and the contracting
officer.200 The exchange between Agility and the government, however,
did nothing more than demonstrate that the government “merely agreed

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. (quoting Pub. Warehousing Co., ASBCA No. 56022, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,062, 176,110).
Id. at 1373, 1382.
Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id. at 1373, 1383.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
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to consider any exceptions to the [twenty-nine]-day cap.”201 Because the
government was not contractually obligated to make exceptions, the
court affirmed the ASBCA’s denial of Agility’s claim.202
Although the court agreed with the ASBCA’s analysis of the breach of
contract claim, the court found that the ASBCA erred by failing to analyze
Agility’s implied duty and constructive change claims.203 The implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to expand a party’s express
contractual duty.204 But the court held that a “party might breach this
implied duty by interfering with another party’s performance or acting in
such a way as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party
regarding the benefits provided by the contract.”205 Thus, even though
the government abided by the express terms of the contract, the court
explained that the government may have breached its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing by, for example, “unnecessarily delaying the
return of Agility’s trucks and not increasing its on-site food storage
capabilities.”206 The government could not impose a twenty-nine-day cap
on fees but then “engage[] in conduct that made it impossible for Agility
to perform within the cap.”207 The court vacated the ASBCA’s decision as
to the implied duty claim and remanded the case to the ASBCA to decide
that claim in the first instance.208
The court also determined that the ASBCA erred by failing to
consider Agility’s constructive change claim.209 To prove a constructive
change claim, “a plaintiff must show (1) that it performed work beyond
the contract requirements, and (2) that the additional work was ordered,
expressly or impliedly, by the government.”210 Agility contended that the
government constructively changed the contract by increasing the
number of instances where trucks were held on site for storage
purposes.211 According to the court, the ASBCA erred in not considering
this contention because a contract change does not need to constitute
201. Id. at 1383.
202. Id. (finding that there was no error in the ASBCA’s judgment on the issue of
exceptions).
203. Id. at 1385 (vacating the ASBCA’s decision on the implied duty claim).
204. Id. at 1384 (citing Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
205. Id. (citing Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1385.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
211. Id.
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an express breach of contract.212 The court therefore instructed the
ASBCA to also consider Agility’s constructive change claim on remand.
4.

Importance of the case
Agility PWC solidified the Federal Circuit’s trend towards a more
expansive view of implied duty claims. The Federal Circuit’s 2014
decision in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United States213 was the first case to
give new life to contractor claims for breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. In Metcalf, the court clarified that
contractors do not need to show that the government “specifically
targeted” benefits of the contract to prove an implied duty claim.214
The court in Metcalf was also clear that “a breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing does not require a violation of an express
provision in the contract.”215 Agility PWC reaffirmed this principle. In
the wake of Metcalf and Agility PWC, implied duty claims will likely
proliferate as contractors seek to recover increased costs of
performance caused by government actions that frustrate their
contractual rights or benefits.
E. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States
In contrast to the warzone contracts examined above, the contract
at issue in Call Henry involved a run-of-the-mill domestic service
contract governed by the Service Contract Act (SCA). The contract
included a standard SCA price adjustment clause that allowed the
contractor to recover increased costs incurred to comply with the
statute over the course of a multi-year contract.216 The price
adjustment clause effectively shifted the risk of increasing compliance
costs to the government.217 But in Call Henry, the court denied the
contractor’s attempt to recover pension withdrawal liability costs under
that provision in a decision that may have significant consequences for
service contractors, their employees, and the government.218

212. Id.
213. 742 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
214. Id. at 992–93.
215. Id. at 994.
216. Id. at 1351.
217. Id. (explaining that the price adjustment clause is the mechanism for
providing the price increase that the government is willing to pay when contractors
incur increased compliance costs).
218. Id. at 1356 (affirming the COFC’s decision to dismiss Call Henry’s complaint
for failure to state a claim).

2018]

2017 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS

1299

1.

Service Contract Act background
The SCA addresses various employment issues that arise when a
recompetition results in a new contractor taking over for an incumbent
on a federal service contract, and the incumbent employees are
“rebadged” to work for the successor contractor.
For one, contracts covered by the SCA must include a “wage
determination” that establishes the minimum wages and fringe
benefits that must be paid to employees performing the work.219
Employees covered under the SCA are entitled to wage rates and
benefits that are equal to or greater than (1) the minimum wage under
the Fair Labor Standards Act; (2) the prevailing wage rates established
by the Department of Labor for the geographic area where the work
will be performed; or (3) the rates set by a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) entered into by the incumbent contractor.220 When
an incumbent, or predecessor, contractor has entered into a CBA, the
successor contractor must pay at least the same wages and fringe
benefits specified in the CBA.221
By requiring a successor contractor to pay at least the same wages
and benefits as the predecessor contractor, the SCA protects
employees from the effects of competition on government contracts.
Without the so-called predecessor contractor rule, incumbent
contractors who engaged in collective bargaining would be at high risk
of being underbid on the successor contract by one who did not offer
fair wages.222 This would frustrate “one of the [SCA’s] principal policy
implications . . . that the U.S. government, as a customer, is willing to
pay a premium for services in return for its contractor’s obligation to
compensate service employees adequately and fairly.”223
To effectuate this policy, the SCA price adjustment clause “provides a
framework for increasing the unit labor rates in a service contract when
certain events occur that increase the costs of complying with an

219. 41 U.S.C. §§ 6703(1), (2) (2012).
220. Id. §§ 6703, 6704.
221. Id. § 6707(c)(1); see also 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-41(f) (2017).
222. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1350.
223. Id. at 1351; see also S. REP. NO. 89-798, at 3–4 (1965) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 89-948, at 2–3 (1965) (explaining the need for this legislation as federal service
contractors are “one of the most disadvantaged groups of our workers and little hope
exists for an improvement of their position without some positive action to raise their
wage levels . . . [and] [t]he Federal Government has added responsibility in this
area”)).
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increased wage determination.”224 For contracts that span multiple
years, the price adjustment clause allows the contractor to obtain a price
increase if it incurs additional costs to comply with a wage determination
or applicable CBA in effect on the anniversary date of the contract or at
the beginning of a renewal option period.225 Because the contractor is
entitled to price increases, the price adjustment clause requires the
contractor to warrant that its original contract price does not include
any contingency to cover costs for which adjustment is provided.226
In Lear Siegler Services, Inc. v. Rumsfeld,227 the Federal Circuit held that
“the price adjustment clause is triggered by changes in an employer’s cost
of compliance with the terms of a wage determination.”228 According to
the court, the lack of a change in the level of benefits mandated by a
CBA is irrelevant to a price adjustment clause inquiry.229 Thus, in Lear,
the court concluded that the contractor was entitled to a price
adjustment to cover the increased costs it incurred to comply with
health benefits defined in the applicable CBA, even though there was
no change in the level of benefits required under the CBA.230
2.

Background
In April 2003, Call Henry, Inc., entered into a multi-year, SCAcovered contract to provide inspection, maintenance, and testing
services to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA).231 The contract included a three-year base period and seven
one-year options.232 Call Henry’s employees were members of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 416 (“the
Teamsters”).233 Call Henry negotiated a CBA with the Teamsters that
was effective from 2003 to 2007.234
The CBA required Call Henry to join and contribute to the
“Teamsters’ Pension Plan,” which was subject to the Multi-Employer
Pension Plan Amendment Act (MPPAA).235 The MPPAA “requir[es]
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1351–52.
48 C.F.R. § 52.222-43(d).
§ 52.222-43(b).
457 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id.
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any employer who withdraws from the plan to pay withdrawal liability
to the pension fund.”236 The withdrawal liability is used to fund the
employer’s share of its pension plan’s obligations while it was
associated with the plan.237
When the base period of Call Henry’s contract expired in 2007,
NASA executed the first option year.238 Call Henry’s “option contract
was a successor contract to the three-year base performance period.”239
As a consequence, the CBA effective from 2003 to 2007 became the
“wage determination” applicable to the first option year.240 Call Henry
entered into a new CBA applicable to the first option year and, as
“NASA continued to exercise option contracts . . . [,] Call Henry
continued to enter into new [CBAs] with the Teamsters.”241 During
the option periods, Call Henry’s mandatory pension obligations
increased, and it became more costly to fund the Teamsters’ Pension
Plan under each successive CBA.242 As a result, at each renewal, NASA
provided an upward price adjustment on the contract pursuant to the
SCA to compensate Call Henry for its increased pension obligations.243
In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decertified the
Teamsters as the representative for Call Henry’s employees.244 The
NLRB’s decertification order resulted in Call Henry’s “withdrawal”
from the Teamsters’ Pension Plan. This triggered Call Henry’s liability
under the MPPAA.245 Although Call Henry was potentially liable for
approximately $6 million in withdrawal liability, it was able to reduce
that amount to less than $2 million through arbitration.246
After the arbitration decision, Call Henry filed a certified claim to
the NASA contracting officer seeking reimbursement for the assessed

236. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012).
237. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1352 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b)(1) (2012); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. When the government exercises an option, the contractor becomes a
“successor” contractor to itself. See 29 C.F.R. § 4.163(e) (2016) (stating that the SCA
“is applicable by its terms to a successor contract without regard to whether the
successor contractor was also the predecessor contractor”).
241. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1353.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (noting that a new union, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, replaced the Teamsters as the representative of the employees).
245. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a).
246. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1353.
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MPPAA withdrawal liability under the SCA price adjustment clause.247
In Call Henry’s view, the withdrawal liability was recoverable as an
increased cost of providing pension benefits under its CBA with the
Teamsters.248 But NASA’s contracting officer disagreed and denied the
claim on the basis that “MPPAA withdrawal liability is not an increased
cost of complying with the [CBAs], but a result of withdrawal from the
pension fund.”249
3.

The Court of Federal Claims’s decision
Call Henry filed a single-count complaint at the COFC alleging that
NASA breached the contract by failing to adjust the contract price to
offset the increased pension costs.250 NASA filed a motion to dismiss Call
Henry’s claim on the grounds that NASA had no contractual obligation
to provide an adjustment for Call Henry’s MPPAA withdrawal liability.251
NASA argued that withdrawal liability is not a fringe benefit covered by
the SCA but rather a distinct statutory liability under the MPPAA.252 The
COFC granted NASA’s motion, relying on what the Federal Circuit
later characterized as “two independent lines of reasoning.”253
First, the COFC held that the SCA does not incorporate all of the
terms of a CBA into the contract, only the wage and fringe benefit
amounts.254 The COFC reasoned that Call Henry’s withdrawal liability
was recoverable only if it constituted a “fringe benefit” covered by the
SCA.255 Second, the COFC concluded that withdrawal liability is not a
“fringe benefit” under the SCA because it is an independent benefit
covered by a different statute—the MPPAA.256 Because withdrawal
liability is a benefit that is required by another federal law, it could not
also be a fringe benefit under the SCA.257 Further, the COFC noted
that although the Teamsters’ CBA required Call Henry to contribute
to the Pension Plan, it did not mention withdrawal liability.258
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1353–54.
249. Id. at 1354.
250. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 282, 284 (2016), aff’d, 855 F.3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1354.
254. Call Henry, 125 Fed. Cl. at 286.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 4.171(c) (2016)).
258. Id.
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Therefore, the COFC determined that Call Henry’s liability under the
MPPAA is not a fringe benefit covered by the contract, and, as a result,
NASA did not breach the contract by refusing to pay the withdrawal
liability under the price adjustment clause.259
4.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision but, in doing so,
effectively sidestepped the question of whether MPPAA withdrawal
liability is a fringe benefit covered by the SCA. The court noted that
Call Henry, with the support from amicus curiae Professional Services
Council, “devote[d] considerable attention” to that issue,260 yet the
court determined that the issue was not dispositive in this case.261 The
court concluded that Call Henry’s claim would fail even if the court
“held that MPPAA withdrawal liability may, in some cases, be a cost of
providing fringe benefits covered by the SCA.”262
Under the court’s reasoning, Call Henry’s withdrawal liability was not
a recoverable cost under the price adjustment clause because it did not
result from complying with a wage determination applied to Call
Henry’s NASA contract.263 The court distinguished Call Henry from Lear
by explaining that the contractor in Lear was contractually bound to the
agency to provide certain fringe benefits to its employees pursuant to
the mandatory SCA provisions of the contract.264 Here, however, the
court concluded that “Call Henry’s contract with NASA did not obligate
Call Henry to pay MPPAA liability in the event of withdrawal.”265
According to the court, “Call Henry independently assumed the risk
of MPPAA withdrawal liability” because it chose to negotiate a CBA
with the Teamsters that required it to join the Teamsters’ Pension
Plan.266 The court was convinced that the price adjustment clause did
not “allocate the risk of MPPAA liability to the government” under
these circumstances because “NASA did not require Call Henry to
negotiate with the Teamsters or join the Teamsters’ Pension Plan.”267
Additionally, NASA had no contractual remedies against Call Henry if

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 288.
Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id.
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Call Henry failed to meet its MPPAA withdrawal liability obligations.268
For those reasons, the court affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of Call
Henry’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
5.

Importance of the decision
Although the Federal Circuit sidestepped the question of whether
withdrawal liability is a “fringe benefit,” its reasoning nevertheless
rejects the view that withdrawal liability is an integral part of the
underlying pension benefit guaranteed under the CBA.269 Call Henry
owed withdrawal liability for pension benefits that it should have been
paying to the employees performing the contract if the Teamsters’
Pension Plan had done proper actuarial assessments.270 As a result, the
withdrawal liability could be viewed as just a substitute for the pension
benefits payable under the CBA and thus the SCA as a “fringe benefit.”
But the Federal Circuit’s decision declined to recognize the
interrelationship between withdrawal liability and the underlying SCA
fringe benefit, emphasizing instead the absence of NASA’s contractual
right to compel payment of the withdrawal liability.271 Given the
significance of potential MPPAA withdrawal liability, Call Henry may
cause service contractors to seriously reconsider whether they should
enter into CBAs to fulfill their obligations under the SCA.272 This, in
turn, could have undesirable effects on workers and the government’s
efforts to promote fair and equal pay for workers.
II. JURISDICTIONAL CASES
The common denominator among the three 2017 cases discussed in
this Section may explain, at least in part, how these cases reached the
Federal Circuit. In all of the three cases the parties did not stand in a
typical owner-contractor posture, where pressures such as maintaining
collegial business relationships and contractor positioning for favorable
performance ratings can nudge the parties toward compromise and
settlement. One plaintiff was a Native American tribe that received
268. Id.
269. See id. at 1355 (noting that MPPAA withdrawal liability is not a cost of
complying with wage determinations).
270. MPPAA withdrawal liability is based on the “amount of unfunded vested
benefits allocable to the employer withdrawn from the plan” and that amount is
determined using actuarial assumptions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1393 (2012).
271. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1356.
272. See Daniel Abrahams & Andrew Crawford, Pension Withdrawal Liability—The
SCA Trap, 59 GOV’T CONTRACTOR, May 2017, at 3.
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statutory block grants from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD); another was a hospital group that complained
about reimbursement rates under a federal health care program; and
the third was a shareholder of a financial institution who believed that
it got the short end of the stick when the government bailed out the
institution during the 2008 financial crisis.
As for their contributions to the legal canon, this year’s jurisdictional
cases further elaborated on considerations that play into whether a
statute is “money mandating” for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction
and also on standing issues for third party claimants.
A. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States
In suits against the United States under the Tucker Act, jurisdiction
cannot rest upon the Tucker Act alone because it does not create a
substantive cause of action.273 Thus, a plaintiff must identify a separate
source of money-mandating substantive law that creates a right to
money damages in order to establish jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act.274 In Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States,275 the
Federal Circuit examined the question as to whether a reduction in
future payments under a grant program that conditions the use of
funds states a claim under a money-mandating statute.276
1.

Background
In 1996, Congress enacted the Native American Housing Assistance
and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA) with the goal of improving
housing conditions and socioeconomic status for Indian tribes and their
members so that they would be able to “take greater responsibility for
their own economic condition.”277 The NAHASDA established an
annual block grant system that allowed tribes to provide affordable
housing to tribe members.278 Specifically, the statute required HUD to
make grants according to a specific regulatory formula.279 The tribes
were limited in how they could spend these funds, and failure to comply

273. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
274. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216–17; Testan, 424 U.S. at 398.
275. 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
276. Id. at 1315.
277. 25 U.S.C. § 4101(4) (2012).
278. Id. § 4111(a)(1).
279. Id. § 4152(b)(1)–(3).
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with statutory requirements allowed HUD to recapture funds.280
The Lummi Tribe and three tribal housing entities (“the Tribes”)
had qualified for and received NAHASDA block grants.281 In 2001, the
HUD Inspector General determined that HUD had improperly
allocated funds to the Tribes and provided an opportunity to dispute
and appeal the findings.282 HUD ultimately recovered the funds
erroneously paid by withholding amounts from grant allocations in
subsequent years.283
2.

The Court of Federal Claims’s decision
The Tribes sued in the COFC under the Tucker Act and the Indian
Tucker Act.284 The suit alleged that HUD deprived the Tribes of funds
to which they were entitled by misapplying the required formula and
by denying the Tribes a hearing.285 The government moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the NAHASDA block grant
provision was not a money-mandating statute.286 The COFC denied
this motion on grounds that the language “shall . . . make grants” and
“shall allocate any amounts” in the statute bound HUD “to pay a
qualifying tribe the amount to which it is entitled under the
formula.”287 Accordingly, the COFC found the statute to be money
mandating.288
The Tribes had also argued that HUD’s alleged violations of the
procedural requirements for hearing rendered the subsequent
withholding of grant funds an illegal exaction.289 The COFC found
that even if the agency erred by not affording the Tribes a hearing, the
procedural violations could not support an illegal exaction claim.290
The COFC explained that “nothing in the statutory framework . . .
suggests that the remedy for failure to afford procedural rights is,

280. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4139, 4161(a)(1).
281. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1315.
282. Id. at 1315–16.
283. Id. at 1316.
284. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1505 (2012)).
285. Id. at 1316.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Lummi Tribe of Lummi Reservation v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl.
584, 594 (2011)).
288. Id.
289. Id. This argument was made after the procedural claim was first dismissed by
the COFC and the Tribes amended their complaint.
290. Id. at 1317.
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without further proof of entitlement, the payment of money.”291 The
government appealed the holding that NAHASDA was money
mandating, and the Tribes appealed the lack of remedy for the
procedural violation.292
3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit determined that the COFC erred in finding that
the NAHASDA was a money-mandating statute.293 The Federal Circuit
determined that “[a] statute is money mandating if either: (1) ‘it can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for . . . damages sustained’; or (2) ‘it grants the claimant
a right to recover damages either expressly or by implication.’”294
To reach its decision, the Federal Circuit analyzed its holding in
National Center for Manufacturing Sciences v. United States.295 There, a
statute had mandated that “not less than $40,000,000 of the funds
appropriated in this paragraph shall be made available only for the
[plaintiff]” by the Air Force.296 In that case, however, the Air Force had
only released $24,125,000 in funding.297 The plaintiff in National Center
brought suit in district court, citing Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) jurisdiction.298 The Air Force moved to dismiss, or in the
alternative, to transfer to the COFC, contending that the case arose
under the Tucker Act.299 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit on appeal
found that a simple money judgment was not sufficient, that injunctive
relief was required, and that the appropriation of funds was limited by
statute for specific purposes.300 According to the Federal Circuit, this
meant that the district court was not divested of authority to conduct
an APA review because the “Tucker Act suit in the [COFC would] not

291. Id. (quoting Order at 5, Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United
States, No. 08-848C (Fed. Cl. Sept. 30, 2015), ECF No. 121 (denying plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting Blueport Co. v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed Cir.
2008)).
295. 114 F.3d 196, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
296. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1317 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Ctr., 114
F.3d at 198).
297. Nat’l Ctr., 114 F.3d at 198.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 202.
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serve as the ‘other adequate remedy in a court.’”301
When the court applied National Center to the facts in Lummi Tribe, the
result was a severe restriction on what remedies would be available to the
Tribes. In Lummi Tribe, although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that
it had not expressly found in National Center that the COFC lacked
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded that, under
NAHASDA, the Tribes are not entitled to an actual payment of money
damages in the strictest terms; their only alleged harm is having been
allocated too little in grant funding.302 Thus, at best, the Tribes sought
a nominally greater strings-attached disbursement, but any monies so
disbursed could still be later reduced or clawed back.303
And,
similar to the restrictions on the use of funds in National Center, “[t]he
Tribes are even restricted with respect to the particular bidding and
bond terms they may use for, say, housing construction contracts.”304
The Federal Circuit, analogizing to the holding in National Center,
refused to stretch the remedy of damages to cover highly regulated
future grant disbursements.305 After describing the relief sought as
equitable in nature, the Federal Circuit held that “[a]lthough the
Tucker Act has been amended to permit the [COFC] to grant
equitable relief ancillary to claims for monetary relief, there must be an
underlying claim for actual presently due money damages from the
United States.”306 The Federal Circuit then held that the Tribes’
underlying claim was not for presently due money damages but rather
to force the payment of strings attached grants, which were not
authorized by statute as a “free and clear transfer of money.”307 The
Federal Circuit unanimously concluded that the NAHASDA was not
money mandating.308
Separately, the Federal Circuit quickly disposed of the Tribes’ illegal
exaction claims on the basis that “[a]n illegal exaction claim must be
based on property taken from the claimant, not property left unawarded

301. Id.
302. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, 870 F.3d 1313, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
303. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 4161(a)(1) (2012)).
304. 870 F.3d at 1318 (citing 2 C.F.R. § 200.325 (2017); 24 C.F.R. § 1000.26 (2017)).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1319 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Air Traffic
Controllers Ass’n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716 (Fed Cir. 1998)).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1317.
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to the claimant.”309 Because the Tribes could not show that failure to
disburse money that was never in their possession was an illegal
exaction, the Federal Circuit also rejected this alternate theory of
jurisdiction.310
4.

Importance of the case
Lummi Tribe demonstrates that when seeking to invoke jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act, the fact that money damages “may flow from a
decision that [an agency] has erroneously interpreted or applied its
regulation” is not enough to change the fundamental nature of a case
seeking equitable relief into one for money damages.311 Claims for
equitable relief must be ancillary to an underlying claim for actual
presently due money damages.312 Further, where money may only be
paid in the future and any payment is conditioned with restrictions on
the way in which it may be used, the statute may not be said to be
money mandating.313 Instead, these characteristics tend to reveal that
the claim is equitable in nature—seeking to force the government to
take action rather than to vindicate rights to legal damages for actions
already taken. Finally, while a legal exaction claim may provide a
limited source of alternative jurisdiction under the Tucker Act,314 such
a claim is not viable if it seeks property unawarded to the claimant
rather than property taken from the claimant.315
As a final note to Lummi Tribe, the Federal Circuit observed that the
government had taken inconsistent positions with respect to whether
the NAHASDA statute was money mandating.316 Specifically, in Modoc
Lassen Indian Housing Authority v. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development,317 the government had argued to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that a district court’s decision ordering
309. Id. at 1319 (citing Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (stating the proposition that an illegal exaction involves money that was
“improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation”)).
310. Id.
311. Id. (quoting Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
312. Id.
313. See id. at 1318–19.
314. See Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007–08 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(holding that persons can bring suit against the Government under the Act when the
Government has the “citizen’s money in its pocket”).
315. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1319.
316. Id. at 1319–20.
317. 864 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2017).
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HUD to return funds amounted to an award of money damages, which
could only be pursued under the Tucker Act.318 In that case, the Tenth
Circuit had agreed with the government.319 The Federal Circuit stated
that “[o]f the government’s two faces, we find the one presented to the
Claims Court—the one arguing that this is not a suit for Tucker Act
damages—to be the correct one.”320
B. Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States
In Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States,321 the Federal
Circuit was again asked to review whether claimants had stated claims
under a money-mandating statute in order to create Tucker Act
jurisdiction.322 The arguments in the case centered on whether an
agency’s discretionary interpretation of its statute could give rise to a
money-mandating claim.323
1.

Background
In 1956, Congress established a military health care system called
TRICARE to provide health care to current and former military
members and their dependents.324 Under the TRICARE program, the
Department of Defense (DoD) contracts with outside health care
providers to deliver health care to program recipients and reimburses
the providers in accordance with guidelines established by DoD.325
Prior to 2001, the TRICARE statute allowed, but did not require, DoD
to use Medicare reimbursement rules when reimbursing providers.326
But in 2001, Congress amended the statutory language to state that
“[t]he amount to be paid to a provider of services . . . shall be
determined . . . in accordance with the same reimbursement rules as
apply to . . . [Medicare].”327
318. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1319 (citing Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 864 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2017)).
319. Id. at 1320.
320. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
321. 874 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
322. Id. The case never expressly mentions the Tucker Act, but in the COFC, the
Tucker Act had been plead as the jurisdictional provision. See Complaint ¶ 5, Ingham
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. United States, Case No. 13-821-MBH, Dkt#1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2013).
323. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347.
324. Id. at 1342–43.
325. Id. at 1343 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1073(a)(2) (2012) and 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.1
(2008)).
326. Id.
327. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1079(j)(2)).
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In response to the statutory change, DoD instituted a formal
rulemaking process.328 During the rulemaking process, DoD determined
that Medicare was phasing in a new payment methodology for outpatient
services and that DoD planned to follow the Medicare approach.
However, because of the complexities of the Medicare transition process
and the lack of TRICARE cost report data comparable to Medicare’s, it
was not practicable for DoD to adopt the “Medicare Outpatient
Prospective Payment System” for hospital outpatient services.329
DoD issued its final rule in 2005, and that rule applied until 2009
when a new TRICARE payment system for hospitals, similar to
Medicare’s rules, was introduced.330 A group of hospitals that included
Ingham Regional Medical Center complained that the Medicare rules
were only intended for use with individual health care providers rather
than institutions with large overhead costs.331
In response to these complaints, DoD hired an outside consultant to
study the accuracy of TRICARE payments. The study concluded that
DoD had underpaid hospitals for radiology services but that all other
outpatient services had been correctly paid.332 DoD then published a
notice allowing hospitals to request review of their payments for
outpatient radiology services.333 The process outlined for requesting
this review included a requirement for the hospitals to sign a “release
and agreement to accept the discretionary adjusted payment by the
hospital.”334 The hospitals requested the discretionary payments, and
only some signed the release.335
During the review process, some of the hospitals were represented
by counsel and requested a copy of the DoD consultant’s study through
the Freedom of Information Act.336 Upon receipt of the study, the
hospitals determined that the study contained multiple errors and that

328. Id. at 1343–44.
329. Id. at 1343 (quoting the DoD’s 2002 Interim Final Rule implementing
TRICARE program reforms, titled, TRICARE; Sub-Acute Care Program; Uniform
Skilled Nursing Facility Benefit; Home Health Care Benefit; Adopting Medicare
Payment Methods for Skilled Nursing Facilities and Home Health Care Providers, 67
Fed. Reg. 40,597, 40,601 (June 13, 2002)).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1343–44.
333. Id. at 1344.
334. Id. at 1345 (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1345–46.
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all outpatient services had been underpaid.337
2.

The Court of Federal Claims’s decision
The hospitals brought suit in the COFC alleging that they had been
underpaid for all outpatient services.338 The COFC dismissed Ingham’s
breach of contract claims on the ground that the claims were barred by
the release and dismissed the other claims on the ground that they failed
to state a money-mandating claim.339
3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit first addressed the argument that the release
signed by Ingham barred its claim.340 The Court reversed the COFC’s
determination that Ingham’s signed release was “sufficiently broad to
bar all of plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.”341 The Federal Circuit
held that “[a]bsent special circumstances, ‘a general release bars claims
based upon events occurring prior to the date of the release.’”342 But
the Federal Circuit found that the government relied on the release in
the very same contract it was accused of breaching.343 In such
circumstances, the Federal Circuit held that a release cannot bar claims
for breach of contract.344 The Federal Circuit found that Ingham
alleged that DoD failed to follow the methodology for calculating
payment adjustments in the contract and that DoD’s promise to use
this methodology had been part of the consideration for the release.345
The Federal Circuit concluded that DoD could not use the release to
bar Ingham’s contract claims when DoD did not adhere to its own
contractual obligations and found that “hold[ing] otherwise would
allow an agency to flout its contractual commitments with impunity.”346
Turning to the arguments that the COFC had improperly dismissed

337. Id. at 1346.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1346–47.
340. Id. at 1346.
341. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. Id. (quoting Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
343. Id.
344. Id.; see also Link v. Dep’t of Treasury, 51 F.3d 1577, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding agency could not enforce an appeal waiver in a last-chance settlement
agreement because the agency had failed to carry out its responsibilities under the
agreement).
345. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347.
346. Id. at 1346.
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the money-mandating claims for failure to state a claim, the Federal
Circuit first determined that the statute was ambiguous and that
Chevron deference applied.347 The hospitals argued that TRICARE was
required to implement a payment system similar to Medicare
reimbursement rules for hospitals, but that DoD erroneously used
reimbursement rules intended for individual providers instead of
hospitals.348 The Federal Circuit found that the TRICARE statute was
“money-mandating in the sense that it directs the agency to determine
payment amounts in accordance with the same reimbursement rules
as Medicare to the extent practicable.”349 However, the Federal Circuit
found that at the time of the statutory change to the TRICARE statute,
the Medicare rules were also changing and that it was impractical for
DoD to use them.350 The Federal Circuit also found that nothing in
the TRICARE statute required DoD to use the previous Medicare
reimbursement approach and that Congress did not prescribe the
rules that must be used if the Medicare approach was impractical.351
Because it found DoD’s approach reasonable, the Federal Circuit held
that the hospitals could not state a money-mandating claim.352
The hospitals attempted to argue that DoD’s notice allowing for
discretionary adjustments had admitted that DoD did not abide by the
statute.353 But the Federal Circuit found that “DoD’s offer of
discretionary payment adjustments does not mean it lacked the
authority to implement the [reimbursement] rules.”354 The Federal
Circuit concluded that both the actions of adopting the initial payment
rules and offering discretionary payment adjustments had been within
DoD’s discretion under the TRICARE statute.355 Because DoD was not
required to implement any specific reimbursement rules and the
approach adopted by DoD was reasonable, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of the money-mandating claims.356
347. Id. at 1347 (deferring to DoD’s construction of the statute); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding courts
must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if congressional intent is ambiguous
or nonexistent and the agency’s construction of the statute is a permissible one).
348. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1347–48.
352. Id. at 1348.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1079(j)(2) (2012)).
356. Id.
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4.

Importance of the case
Ingham illustrates two important jurisdictional points. First, in the
Federal Circuit, a release cannot be used to bar claims of breach of the
same contract containing the release. Second, with respect to whether
a statute is money-mandating, claims based upon a disagreement with
agency interpretation of the statute will not support a claim where,
under Chevron, the agency has discretion in its interpretation of the
statute, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
C. Starr International Co. v. United States
During the 2008 financial crisis, American International Group, Inc.
(AIG) was “too big to fail,” as its collapse would have posed a risk to
the financial stability of the entire country.357 Apparently, a lawsuit by
AIG’s largest shareholder, Starr International Co., which sough over
$20 billion in compensation for alleged government improprieties
with respect to AIG’s stock post-bailout,358 was “too big to settle.”
In Starr International Co. v. United States,359 the Federal Circuit examined
standing requirements for claims that were derivative of a third party’s
rights.360 The claims in the case concerned a shareholder suit alleging
illegal dilution of value and voting interests as a result of the government’s
takeover of AIG in the wake of the 2007 housing market collapse.361
Although the Federal Circuit applied Delaware law, it first announced the
federal standard and then explained that it was applying Delaware law
because it was consistent with federal law and did not frustrate it.362
1.

Background
AIG is a publicly traded corporation that was caught up in the 2007
collapse of the housing market.363 Facing mounting stresses on its
liquidity, on September 12, 2008, AIG informed the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York (FRBNY) that it needed between $13 billion and $18 billion
to cover its urgent liquidity needs.364 By the morning of September 15,
357. See Renae Merle, AIG Is No Longer “Too Big to Fail,” Regulators Say, WASH. POST
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/29/
aig-is-no-longer-too-big-to-fail-regulators-say.
358. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
359. 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
360. Id. at 958.
361. Id. at 957.
362. Id. at 966.
363. Id. at 958.
364. Id.
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these needs had ballooned to over $75 billion, and another major
financial institution, Lehman Brothers, had also filed for bankruptcy.365
Realizing that the failure of AIG could destabilize the economy, on
September 16, 2008, the FRBNY invoked the Federal Reserve Act to
make an $85 billion loan to AIG with interest and fees in exchange for
79.9% of AIG’s equity.366 That same day, all but one of AIG’s directors
voted to accept the loan notwithstanding the unfavorable terms,
viewing it as better than bankruptcy.367 On September 22, 2008, AIG
entered into the formal agreement by which the federal government
acquired the 79.9% equity interest in the form of preferred stock that
was convertible to common stock.368
At the time of the loan, AIG’s stock was at times dipping below $5.00
per share, and the New York Stock Exchange had a minimum shareprice requirement of $1.00 per share.369 Failure to meet this minimum
would result in delisting of the stock.370 By early 2009, AIG’s stock was
falling below this threshold and AIG was at risk of being delisted.371 On
June 30, 2009, AIG held a shareholder meeting where it proposed two
amendments designed to alter the pool of AIG common stock and allow
AIG to raise capital and raise the stock prices.372 The first of these
amendments—a large increase (nearly double) in the amount of
authorized common stock—failed to pass.373 The second amendment—
a reverse stock split—passed, and Starr International Co. (“Starr”) voted
in favor of the amendment.374 This helped AIG avoid delisting, but it
also made available enough shares of common stock that the
government was able to convert its shares.375 The government
subsequently sold its shares between 2011 and 2012 for a gain of $17.6
billion.376 AIG repaid the $85 billion loan, plus approximately $6.7
billion in interest and fees.377
365. Id.
366. Id. at 958–59. FRBNY loaned AIG the $85 billion by invoking section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
367. Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 959.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 959–60.
373. Id. at 960.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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2.

The Court of Federal Claims’s decision
Starr filed suit in the COFC asserting claims on behalf of itself and
similarly situated shareholders.378 Starr alleged that the government’s
initial acquisition of the 79.9% equity interest was an illegal exaction
and an illegal taking.379 Starr also alleged that the stock split had been
engineered by the government to avoid a shareholder vote, decrease
the number of issued shares, and dilute the interests of AIG.380 The
government moved to dismiss Starr’s claims for lack of standing, but
the COFC allowed the claims to proceed to trial without resolving the
motion.381 Ultimately, the COFC found that the government’s
acquisition of AIG was an illegal exaction but granted Starr no
monetary relief.382 Starr and the government filed cross appeals.383
3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
Starr appealed the denial of monetary relief, while the government
argued that Starr lacked standing because its claims belonged to AIG
and the acquisition was not an illegal exaction.384 The Federal Circuit
first addressed whether Starr had standing to pursue its claims
directly.385 The Federal Circuit explained that “[f]or a party to have
standing, it must satisfy constitutional requirements and also
demonstrate that it is not raising a third party’s legal rights.”386 The Federal
Circuit assumed that Starr satisfied the constitutional requirements: (1) an
actual or imminent injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and
(3) likely redressability by a favorable decision.387
Turning to whether Starr was asserting a third party’s rights, Starr
argued that it satisfied the standing principle because the government’s
acquisition harmed its personal economic and voting interests
independent of any harm to AIG.388 The Federal Circuit first explained
that both federal and Delaware law were relevant to the question as to

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id.
Id. at 960–61.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 964 (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004)).
Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
Id. at 965.
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whether Starr had direct standing.389 Under federal law, the Federal
Circuit found that shareholders are generally prohibited “from
initiating actions to enforce the rights of [a] corporation unless the
corporation’s management has refused to pursue the same action for
reasons other than good-faith business judgment.”390 Under federal
law only “shareholder[s] with a direct, personal interest in a cause of
action, rather than injuries [that] are entirely derivative of their
ownership interests in a corporation, can bring actions directly.”391
The Federal Circuit explained that
[u]nder Delaware law, whether a shareholder’s claim is derivative or
direct depends on the answers to two questions: “(1) who suffered the
alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually);
and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”392

In Delaware, a claim need not be based on a shareholder injury that
is separate and distinct from that suffered by other stockholders to be
direct. Instead, a claim may be direct if “all stockholders are equally
affected.”393 The Federal Circuit discussed the presumption that state
law should be incorporated into federal common law unless doing so
would frustrate the specific objectives of federal programs. This
presumption was “particularly strong in areas in which private parties
have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights
and obligations would be governed by state-law standards.”394 The
Federal Circuit found that Delaware law was consistent with federal law
and so found Delaware law applicable to Starr’s claims.395
Turning to Starr’s claims, the Federal Circuit found that under Delaware
law, “claims of corporate overpayment are treated as causing harm solely
to the corporation and, thus, are regarded as derivative.”396 Starr’s claims
were found to be dependent on an injury to the corporation—any dilution
in value of a corporation’s stock reduces the value of each share equally,
and the remedy usually goes to the corporation to restore the shares’

389. Id. at 965–66. The Federal Circuit noted that AIG was incorporated in Delaware.
390. Id. at 966 (alteration in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990)).
391. Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 493 U.S. at 336–37).
392. Id. (quoting Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033
(Del. 2004) (en banc)).
393. Id. (quoting Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1038–39).
394. Id. (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991)).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 966–67 (quoting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99 (Del. 2006)).
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value.397 Therefore, the Federal Circuit explained that in order to pursue
such claims, some other provision of Delaware or federal law must give
Starr a direct cause of action to proceed.398
To provide context to its discussion, the Federal Circuit first
observed that Starr did not distinguish between its various equity
claims for standing purposes and instead characterized them as
alleging “the wrongful expropriation of [its] economic and voting
interests in AIG for the [g]overnment’s own corresponding benefit.”399
As the burden of demonstrating standing belonged to Starr, the
Federal Circuit examined standing based on this theory of harm.400
The Federal Circuit also discussed that Starr argued that its case for
standing was particularly compelling because the government’s
acquisition of AIG was equivalent to a physical exaction where the
government engaged in a “physical seizure of four out of every five
shares of [shareholders’] stock.”401
The Federal Circuit declined to adopt Starr’s view of the acquisition,
noting a difference between issuance of new stock, which results in equal
dilution for all shareholders, and transfer of existing stock, which creates
an individual relationship between the parties to the transfer.402 The
Federal Circuit noted that adopting Starr’s position would largely
presuppose the search for a direct and individual injury.403
The Federal Circuit next turned to the merits of Starr’s standing
argument.404 Starr argued that its claims fell within a “dual-nature”
exception in Delaware law that recognized claims that were both
derivative and direct in nature.405 Claimants must meet two criteria in
order for this exception to apply:
(1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the
corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for
assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value, and
(2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the
outstanding shares owned by the controlling stockholder, and a
corresponding decrease in the share percentage owned by the

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 967.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 968.
Id.
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public (minority) shareholders.406

Starr argued that government controlled the acquisition because of
its disparate leverage in the negotiation.407 But the Federal Circuit
rejected this argument because the dual-nature exception stemmed
from a concern about fiduciary misconduct at the expense of minority
shareholders.408 The Federal Circuit found that Delaware law
consistently held that, while control did not require a party to be a preexisting majority stockholder, it did require a fiduciary relationship.409
The Federal Circuit found that outside parties with leverage do not
necessarily have any obligation to protect the interests of the
counterparty, and even less so with respect to constituents of the
counterparty.410 And the Federal Circuit further found that Starr had
not shown any fiduciary relationship or that the government had
actually exercised any direction over AIG’s conduct.411 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit found the dual-nature exception inapplicable.412
Starr next argued that the Supreme Court recognized standing in a case
similar to Starr’s, Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co.413 But the Federal Circuit
found the Alleghany case distinguishable on grounds that the dispute was
between shareholders and the corporation, and so there was not an issue
as to whether the claim belonged to the shareholders derivatively.414 In
contrast to the shareholders in Alleghany, Starr’s interests were aligned with
AIG, not adverse to it.415 For this reason, third party standing was not at
issue in Alleghany, and the case did not help Starr.416
Starr then argued that the government nullified its voting rights that
would have allowed it to block the government’s ability to obtain
preferred stock.417 But the Federal Circuit found that Starr had waived
this argument, and, in any event, Starr had not demonstrated a
fiduciary relationship as would have been required under the only case

406. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d
91, 100 (Del. 2006)).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 969.
411. Id. at 969–70.
412. Id. at 969.
413. 353 U.S. 151 (1957); Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 970.
414. Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 970.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 970–71.
417. Id. at 971.
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it cited in support.418
Next, Starr argued that the Fifth Amendment provided an independent
basis for standing because it created a special relationship between AIG’s
shareholders and the government.419 The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, finding that “Starr does not cite any support for its submission
that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause creates a [g]overnment
‘duty.’”420 Further, “[e]ven if such a duty were to exist, Starr has not
demonstrated why that duty would flow directly to a corporation’s
shareholders rather than the corporation in the context of an equity
transaction that affects all preexisting shareholders collaterally.”421
Finally, Starr argued that it had standing because AIG’s shareholders
were the “direct target of an illegal act.”422 The Federal Circuit found
this argument “untethered to reality.”423 While it acknowledged that
there was some testimony purportedly showing that the government
wanted to punish AIG shareholders, the Federal Circuit pointed out
that the COFC never actually reached this conclusion.424
Because Starr did not demonstrate standing, the Federal Circuit did
not address the merits of its equity claims.425 Turning to Starr’s
remaining direct claims related to the conversion of preferred to
common stock, the Federal Circuit found the COFC did not clearly err
when it found that the primary purpose of the stock split was to avoid
delisting, not to exchange the government’s shares.426 Judge Evan
Wallach filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
result, however, stating that he would have examined jurisdictional
claims first under the Tucker Act and would have determined that the
Federal Reserve Act was not money-mandating.427
4.

Importance of the case
This case showcases that standing issues can present difficult
obstacles to third-party claims. Federal law generally requires a direct
418. Id. at 971–72 (distinguishing Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d
769, 777 (Del. Ch. 1967)).
419. Id. at 972.
420. Id.
421. Id. (citing Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1073 & n.14
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
422. Id. (alteration in original).
423. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
424. Id. at 973.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 973–74.
427. Id. at 975–76.
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injury and prohibits derivative claims.428 State law will only apply where
it does not frustrate federal law, and so it is unlikely in most instances
that this rule would change under an application of state law in federal
court. For instance, here the Federal Circuit applied Delaware law
because it found it to be consistent with federal law.429 Ultimately,
when claims depend on an injury to someone else, they will not satisfy
standing requirements.
III. BID PROTEST CASES
Bid protests account for the other two merits decisions handed down
by the Federal Circuit in 2017. Different barriers tend to weed out
these cases before the Federal Circuit becomes involved. First and
foremost, absent an injunction pending the outcome on the merits in
the COFC or a stay of the judgment pending appeals taken by
contractors, the agency very likely will proceed to award and allow the
awarded contractor to perform. Faced with what may be the hollow
victory of winning a legal point on appeal, but being left with little
remedy because the contract will have been largely performed by the
time the Federal Circuit rules, many protesters will drop the case.
A. Diaz v. United States
1.

Background
In Diaz v. United States,430 appellant Kevin Diaz submitted an “unsolicited
proposal” to the U.S. Department of the Navy’s Indian Head Explosive
Ordinance Disposal Technology Division under FAR 15.6.431 The
contracting officer who reviewed the proposal found that it did not meet
the FAR 15.606-1 requirements and rejected the proposal.432 Mr. Diaz
filed a complaint in the COFC challenging that rejection, but the case was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Diaz lacked
standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012).433 Mr. Diaz appealed.434

428. Id. at 966 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S.
331, 336 (1990)).
429. Id.
430. 853 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
431. Id. at 1357.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
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2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the COFC decision to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.435 First, it addressed the COFC’s subject
matter jurisdiction.436 Section 1491(b)(1) grants subject matter
jurisdiction for any “violation of a statute or regulation in connection
with a procurement or proposed procurement” and is intended to be
“very sweeping in scope.”437 Here, because Mr. Diaz had received a
significant number of emails from government personnel regarding his
proposal, the court found that his proposal qualified as a “proposed
procurement.”438 Therefore, Mr. Diaz’s allegation that the contracting
officer had improperly rejected his unsolicited proposal was found to be
a non-frivolous allegation of a violation of a regulation in connection
with a proposed procurement.439
Second, the court addressed Mr. Diaz’s standing to file a bid protest.440
Under § 1491(b)(1), a party must show that it is both an “interested
party”441 and that it was “prejudiced by a significant error in the
procurement process.”442 Under the interested party prong, a party
must prove (1) that it is an actual or prospective bidder and (2) that it
has a direct economic interest in the proposed procurement.443 The
court noted that it had not established a standard for evaluating whether
a party has a direct economic interest in an unsolicited proposal, but it
approved of and adopted the COFC’s application of the “substantial
chance” standard.444 The court therefore examined whether Mr. Diaz
would have had a substantial chance of winning a contract which the
government had never solicited.445
To have a substantial chance of winning the contract based on an
unsolicited proposal, a party must conform with the requirements of
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. (quoting RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
438. Id. at 1358.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. (quoting Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2012)).
442. Id. (quoting Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2009)).
443. Id. (citing Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
444. Id. at 1358–59.
445. Id.
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FAR 15.6.446 In order to be a “valid unsolicited proposal” under FAR
15.603, the proposal must
(1) [b]e innovative and unique;
(2) [b]e independently originated and developed by the offeror;
(3) [b]e prepared without Government supervision, endorsement,
direction, or direct Government involvement;
(4) [i]nclude sufficient detail to permit a determination that
Government support could be worthwhile and the proposed work
could benefit the agency’s research and development or other
mission responsibilities;
(5) [n]ot be an advance proposal for a known agency requirement
that can be acquired by competitive methods; and
(6) [n]ot address a previously published agency requirement.447

The contracting officer determined that Mr. Diaz’s proposal did not
meet the first and fourth elements and was therefore not a valid proposal.448
Mr. Diaz was unable to overcome this determination on appeal.449 The
court held that Mr. Diaz failed to satisfy his burden to establish interested
party status and that he did not have standing.450 Based on this finding, the
court did not address the requisite showing of prejudice.451
3.

Importance of the case
The case addressed the novel issue of the appropriate standard for
determining the factors of a direct economic interest in the submission
of an unsolicited proposal. The court adopted the post-award standard
whereby a plaintiff must show a “substantial chance of winning the
contract,” even though the government did not solicit any proposals.452
B.

Dellew Corp. v. United States

1.

Background
In Dellew Corp. v. United States,453 the U.S. Department of the Army
awarded a contract to Tech Systems, Inc. (“TSI”) for logistics support

446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1359 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 15.603 (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360 n.3.
Id. at 1358–59.
855 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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services in Hawaii.454 Dellew filed a post-award bid protest in the
COFC, alleging that the award to TSI was improper because “(1) TSI
did not accept a material term of the request for proposals when it
refused to cap its general and administrative rate, (2) the contract
awarded varied materially from TSI’s proposal,” and (3) the “Army had
failed to perform an adequate cost realism analysis before awarding
the contract to TSI.”455
During oral argument on the cross-motions for judgment on the
administrative record, the COFC announced that it intended to rule
in Dellew’s favor on the merits.456 The court repeatedly made clear its
view that corrective action would be appropriate, and it encouraged
the Army to reconsider its award decision in order to avoid the issuance
of a “needless ruling.”457
The court required the parties to provide a joint status report within
ten days of the hearing.458 In the joint status report, the Army
announced that it had determined that changed conditions required
an amendment to the solicitation.459 It terminated the contract with
TSI and filed a motion to dismiss Dellew’s protest as moot.460
The COFC granted the motion to dismiss the action and declined
Dellew’s invitation to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of a finding that Dellew was the prevailing party.461 In the COFC’s
view, given the dismissal of the protest, such findings and conclusions
would amount to an advisory opinion, which is prohibited by the Case or
Controversy Clause of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.462
Nonetheless, Dellew sought attorney fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d)(1)(A).463 In its
EAJA ruling, the COFC awarded Dellew nearly $80,000 in fees and
costs, holding that its comments during oral argument “carried a
454. Id. at 1377.
455. Id. at 1377–78.
456. Id. at 1378; Dellew Corp. v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 85, 89 (2016), rev’d, 855
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
457. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1378.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.; Dellew Corp. v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 429, 433 n.2 (2015); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
463. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(d)(1)(A) (2012)); Dellew Corp. v. United States,
127 Fed. Cl. 85, 87 (2016), rev’d, 855 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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sufficient judicial imprimatur to materially alter the relationship
between [Dellew] and [the government] such that [Dellew] qualifies
as a prevailing party under the EAJA.”464 The court listed four reasons
why Dellew was a prevailing party: (1) the court had expressed its
intention to rule in Dellew’s favor at oral argument, (2) it had clearly
stated its view that the Army should take corrective action, (3) the
Army’s corrective action was not voluntary, and (4) the court’s
comment occurred after the parties had briefed the issues and the
court had prepared a written decision.465 The government appealed.466
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit reviewed the COFC’s finding that Dellew qualified
as a prevailing party de novo.467 Under the EAJA, “a court shall award to
a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party in any civil action . . . bought by or against the
United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.”468 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party
is one that obtains a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties.”469 A prevailing party does not include a party who obtained relief
through “a defendant’s voluntary change in conduct.”470
The Federal Circuit held that Dellew was not a prevailing party for
three reasons. First, the government took corrective action before the
COFC issued either an oral or written ruling on the merits.471 The
government’s actions were therefore voluntary.472 Second, the COFC’s
expression of intent to rule in Dellew’s favor did not carry a sufficient
judicial imprimatur to materially change the relationship of the parties
because it was not equivalent to a “court-ordered change.”473 The
COFC explicitly postponed ruling until after receipt of the joint status
report and permitted additional briefing, indicating that it was
464. Dellew Corp., 127 Fed. Cl. at 89.
465. Id.
466. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1377.
467. Id. at 1379.
468. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012)).
469. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791–93 (2001)).
470. Id. at 605.
471. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1380.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1381.
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offering the government an opportunity to take corrective action but
not requiring it to do so.474 Third, the COFC improperly relied on its
ruling in a prior case, Universal Fidelity LP v. United States,475 where the
court had found the protester to be the “prevailing party” after the
court had issued an injunctive order in the plaintiff’s favor.476
The Federal Circuit instead found the COFC should have examined
relevant Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law such as Rice
Services., Ltd. v. United States477 and Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United
States.478 For these reasons, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s
order awarding attorney fees and costs to Dellew.
3.

Importance of the case
This case establishes that a party is not a prevailing party for purposes
of an award of costs/fees under the EAJA when an agency takes
corrective action at the suggestion of the court rather than by order of
the court. This holding creates a bright line rule in which one may not
rightly be deemed to be a “prevailing party” for EAJA purposes absent
a written court order requiring the agency to take a certain action.479
There is evident tension embedded in the Federal Circuit’s holding.
Although whether one is a “prevailing party” under the EAJA is a
question of law, the vantage point of the trial court is vastly superior to
the Federal Circuit’s in the factual context presented. The COFC
judge knew far better than the Federal Circuit panel what was meant
by what was said in the hearing on the cross-motions.480
In this regard, the practical effect of Dellew may be limited and is
474. Id.
475. 70 Fed. Cl. 310, 315–16 (2006) (ruling that the protestor was the “prevailing
party” within the meaning of the EAJA because the defendant-government’s action in
curing deficiencies in the solicitation bid was court ordered and not voluntary, and
therefore, was tantamount to a judgment on the merits that altered the legal
relationship between the plaintiff and the government).
476. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1382.
477. 405 F.3d 1017, 1026–27 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a dismissal order did
not confer “prevailing party” status on the plaintiff because it did not function as the
equivalent of either an enforceable judgment or a court-ordered consent decree where
the defendant undertook voluntary curative action before the COFC issued a ruling).
478. 288 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that a defendant’s action taken
due to preliminary comments made by a court ordered change in the legal
relationship between the parties that would confer “prevailing party” status on
plaintiff); 855 F.3d at 1382.
479. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1380–83.
480. See Baron Servs., Inc. v. Media Weather Innovations LLC, 717 F.3d 907, 918 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (deferring to the trial court’s superior vantage of litigation dynamics).
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limitable by COFC judges. In similar circumstances, the COFC judge
simply can enter a bare bones “minute order” that directs the government
to stay performance and to take other appropriate corrective actions that
answer the court’s concerns as stated on the record. This will be sufficient
under Dellew’s interpretation of the EAJA’s “prevailing party” requirement
to support the award of fees and costs to the protester.
CONCLUSION
In 2017, the Federal Circuit spun some cautionary tales for federal
contractors who were forced to absorb revenues that were much lower
or costs that were much higher than anticipated at the time of
contracting. To name a few, a would-be marina operator ended up
leasing “mud front” property for years (Lee’s Ford Dock), a long-time
local construction firm’s workforce was newly barred from the jobsite
(Garco), and a service contractor got left holding the bag on a huge
pension liability (Call Henry). While contracting with the federal
government certainly can be lucrative for contractors, it is not without
traps for the unwary or unlucky.

